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 This chapter reflects on the paradox of Eurosceptic populists critical of the 
European Union mobilizing ideas of European values, heritage, and civiliza-
tion. We examine the role of the past and especially of a certain understand-
ing of ‘European heritage’ in far-right-wing populist, nationalist discourse in 
Europe today. We also interrogate the ‘perverse confluences’ ( cf. Clarke et al., 
2014 : 15) of such populist ideas with allegedly inclusive notions of European 
heritage promoted by EU institutions. For many right-wing populists, Europe 
is comprised of diverse cultural nations and regions that unite in a moral ‘com-
munion of shared values’ ( Thran and Boehnke, 2015 : 192) that are grounded 
in a shared civilizational heritage. This brand of Europeanism coexists with 
a strong sense of national identity and even a militant nationalism. The best 
example is Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West), 
a German nationalist, anti-Islam, and anti-migrant right-wing movement that 
has informed populist attitudes across Europe and now has chapters in sev-
eral other countries, including the UK and the Netherlands. Amidst fluttering 
Dutch flags, a banner at a recent Pegida demonstration in the Netherlands recit-
ing ‘Islamization=EUthanasia’ ( Islamisering=EUthanasie ) shows that populists 
view an alleged ongoing ‘Islamization’ as a deadly threat not only to national 
culture but also to Europe, which some of them hold dear. 
 Our argument is based on a qualitative data analysis of the responses given 
by approximately eighty populist parties’ supporters across Europe. Ayhan Kaya 
and Ayşe Tecmen’s CoHERE team interviewed them between 15 March and 
30 May 2017 in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. What do 
these people think of ‘European culture’ and a ‘European heritage’, and how 
do such understandings relate to their belief in national culture? We asked Kaya 
and Tecmen to include these two questions among the ones they administered. 
Populist supporters’ answers illuminate how a discourse of civilizational Euro-
pean heritage coexists in varying degrees of tension with populism’s emphasis 
on the centrality of the nation. 
 In the tradition of Ruth  Wodak (2015 ), we define right-wing populism as 
a political discourse rather than a fully fledged, articulated ideology: a loosely 
connected set of ideas, attitudes, and socialized and politicized emotions. 
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Populist discourse fundamentally relies on a sharp us/them divide and on a 
distinctive understanding of ‘the people’ as non-immigrant, white, and disen-
franchised ( Wodak, 2015 ; see also  Mouffe, 2005 ). ‘The people’ are discursively 
pitted against an enemy ‘other’. Antagonistic towards political elites, populists 
however scapegoat migrants and minorities for rising inequalities and poverty, 
thus substituting a class enemy with a cultural, racialized one. Such others are 
imagined as hard, if not impossible, to assimilate, and are therefore regarded as 
a threat to what populists view as the indispensable foundation of a political 
community: a primordial, essentialized national culture. 
 By excluding migrants and minorities from both national and European col-
lectives on the ground of their alleged cultural incommensurability, right-wing 
populist discourse mobilizes what social scientists since the late 1980s have 
called ‘new racism’ or ‘cultural racism’ (Balibar, 1991). With older, biologically 
based racial hierarchies being discredited due to their association with Nazism, 
a new form of racism in disguise has emerged that emphasizes the incompat-
ibility of heritages and values ( Lentin and Titley, 2011 ;  Lentin, 2014 ). This 
racism is ‘concealed inside apparently innocent language about culture’ ( Barker, 
1981 : 3;  Stolcke, 1995 ). In the late 1990s, Verena  Stolcke observed in Europe 
 the resurgence of the old demon of racism in a new guise. [There is] a 
perceptible shift in the rhetoric of exclusion. . . . From what were once 
assertions of the differing endowment of human races, there has risen since 
the seventies a rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion that emphasizes the dis-
tinctiveness of cultural identity, traditions, and heritage among groups and 
assumes the closure of culture by territory. 
 (1999: 25) 
 Nation, identity, culture, heritage, and territory are conflated and made iso-
morphic in populist discourse: people are ‘fixed in place’ by their cultural 
belonging and heritage. Through cultural racism, ideological constructs of heri-
tage and memory, rendered immutable and natural, are mobilized to shape new 
racialized understandings of ‘the people’. 
 Populists do not believe in the hard-and-fast existence of national cultures 
and heritages only. Even nationalist political forces may legitimize themselves 
by donning the mantle of European heritage – often talked about as Euro-
pean civilization. According to Roger  Brubaker (2017 : 1193), the national 
populisms of Northern and Western Europe, including those of France and 
the Netherlands, mobilize a discourse of ‘civilizationism’ that constructs the 
‘opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader 
civilizational terms’. In this discourse, Islam and the figure of the Muslim are 
placed in the position of the other. Such deep preoccupation with an alleged 
Islamic civilization threat (‘Islamization’ is the code word for stoking fears of 
Europe’s disappearance) drives a paradoxical stance: the combination of ‘identi-
tarian Christianism’ with a fervent defence of secularism and liberal values such 
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as gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech – which coexist with the 
traditional social conservatism and illiberal authoritarianism of the far right. 
 The most successful among the European right-wing populist parties have 
combined a rhetoric of citizens’ resentment towards elites for the financial cri-
sis and ensuing austerity, with accusations of a cultural decline, enabled – so 
they believe – by overly liberal immigration policies. Parties like the National 
Rally in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and Alternative for 
Germany have drawn on racist sentiment to assert that Islam is incompatible 
with European values and traditions and, by extension, that multiculturalism 
(which they associate with the EU) is unsustainable. Despite their nationalist 
ideology, however, by establishing Muslims as the universal out-group, these 
parties implicitly unify the people of Europe by defining non-Muslim Euro-
peans as a community rooted not in political loyalty towards the EU but rather 
in their common heritage. Our analysis of the CoHERE populism interviews 
reveals the existence of a sense of shared European heritage – even if vague and 
implicit – among many populist supporters alongside their deep attachment to 
national cultures. 
 These in-person interviews were conducted in the native language of the 
respondents. Selected via snowball sampling, female and male populist parties’ 
supporters aged eighteen to sixty-five were interviewed. Supporters belonged 
to the National Rally (then known as the National Front, NF) in France, 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, Golden Dawn (GD) in Greece, 
the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, and the Party for Freedom (PVV) 
in the Netherlands. We captured populist voters’ attitudes towards European 
culture/civilization and European memory/heritage by inviting open-ended 
answers. 
 Answers were subsequently analyzed using the classic qualitative method 
of grounded theory ( Glaser, 1978 ) in a three-stage process. In the first stage, 
we inductively constructed analytical codes and abstract categories extracted 
from the data. Applying narrative identity theory ( Scalise, 2015 ), we avoided 
ambiguous categories like ‘pride’, ‘attachment’, and ‘loyalty’ as well as ‘scaling’ 
perceived degrees of belonging to Europe, and paid attention instead to emic 
categorization and the distinction between meanings attributed to Europe and 
meanings attributed to the EU. In the second stage, we built on quantitative 
research on European cultural identity ( Mitchell, 2014 ; Schilde, 2014;  Westle 
and Segatti, 2016 ) to perform theoretical sampling and refine the categories 
obtained in the first stage. In the third stage, we integrated these categories into 
a theoretical framework (Charmaz, 2006). 
 Overall, despite confounding the EU, Europe, and European heritage, inter-
viewees tend to contrast a negatively connoted EU as economically disadvan-
taging for the nation-state and the working classes with a positively connoted 
idea of European heritage combining ancient Greek and Roman history with 
Christianity and the Enlightenment. World War II is frequently mentioned 
as a key shared experience within an often broadly and vaguely understood 
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‘European history’. Unlike in Brubaker’s sample, it is especially the French 
and German interviewees in our sample who uphold a sense of a common 
European heritage. This is not so much the case among Dutch populist sup-
porters, but it is possible that the timing of the CoHERE interviews, which 
took place immediately after a heated 2017 electoral campaign dominated by 
public debate on ‘Dutch norms and values’, may have influenced interviewees’ 
responses. The Southern European populists in the CoHERE sample sup-
port political formations that are very different from the Northern European 
ones, and very different among themselves. While far-right parties through-
out Europe have changed or at least rebranded themselves by donning some 
kind of liberal mantle, Greece’s ultranationalist Golden Dawn is neo-fascist and 
explicitly draws on Nazi symbols and references. Its leader proudly identifies as 
a racist (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2016). Among the CoHERE Greek 
interviewees, negative feelings about Europe abound but cannot be interpreted 
as a repudiation of European heritage. Rather, these feelings are connected 
to interviewees’ perception of being forcibly excluded by the EU (and more 
powerful European nations) from a European civilization Greece itself orig-
inally birthed. The CoHERE Italian interviewees supporting the Five Star 
Movement (which, despite claiming to be non-ideological, has embraced 
the anti-immigrant positions of its coalition partner in government, the far-
right Northern League) also remarked that European countries share the same 
history. 1 
 Across the sample, there are frequent references to Christianity, and some-
times a Judeo-Christian civilization, as the shared European heritage. At times 
this heritage is qualified as European, at times as broadly Western (which 
includes the US). Overall, while a notion that a common European heritage, 
and especially a common European history, is widely shared, its translation 
into a common cultural identity is not at all straightforward. Populists’ cultural 
racism, in other words, does not solidify into the idea of a common European 
culture and identity. 
 Populist parties’ vision of Europe as a tight bond 
of European nations 
 When asked about their ideas of European heritage, many interviewees, espe-
cially in France and Germany, espoused positions similar to those aired during 
the much-mediatized congress of European far-right populists in Koblenz on 
21 January 2017, the day after Donald Trump’s inauguration in the US. The 
congress envisioned a ‘new Europe’ to be remade by populists. In her speech, 
Marine Le Pen set out the vision of a ‘Renaissance of Europe’ propelled by 
resurging European cultures and a ‘diversity’ of strong nationalisms living in 
freedom and harmony with each other ( Engelhart, 2017 ). Thibaud Gibelin, 
NF parliamentary aide and spokesperson, told a  New Yorker journalist during 
the congress that Europeans clearly share a cultural heritage: ‘We have our 
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Roman roots, our language, our culture; the cathedrals you see, whether in 
Cologne or Paris, that are gothic, that’s transnational; the Renaissance was a 
European phenomenon; and the great religious moments that marked Europe, 
the spread of Christianity, the Reformation, those were never isolated to one 
nation’ ( Zerofsky, 2017 ). This is a list of the historical periods, processes, and 
movements that are broadly seen as the pillars of European heritage also by 
many non-populists, including EU institutions (e.g.  Shore, 2006 ; Delanty, 
2009). The Enlightenment is placed at the top of this list as the pinnacle of 
European civilization and source of the idea of freedom this populist congress 
explicitly celebrated. 
 The meanings that such parties attach to Europeanness is most often implicit 
and relational: Europe and European heritage are pitted against both the EU 
and migrants/Islam – these latter two are often brought together. In AfD’s pro-
gramme, for example, beyond the standard opposition to the EU and the euro, 
Europe is mentioned only briefly, and in the section about asylum policy, which 
argues that ‘the future of Germany and Europe must be secured in the long 
term.  .  . . Migratory movements from Africa to Europe can destabilize the 
continent in a few years’ time’ ( Zuwanderung and Asyl, 2018 ). On the party’s 
website, statements by prominent AfD members explain why migration is a 
threat to Europe and its heritage. The party’s deputy, Beatrix von Storch, claims 
that ‘European  Leitkultur [lead culture] stands on the basis of common value 
canons: the three hills Golgota, Acropolis and Capitol, which are the founda-
tion of occidental culture and which Islam is incompatible with’. But for von 
Storch it is not only Islam that stands against a European ‘lead culture’. ‘Brussels’ 
central state is ahistorical and uneuropean [ sic ], going against the motto of unity 
in diversity’ ( Alternative f ür Deutschland, 2018). Here, von Storch seizes on this 
key EU principle and the idea of Europe by turning it against itself while imply-
ing that right-wing populists are its most genuine adherents. 
 The Rassemblement National (National Rally, NR), led by Marine Le Pen, 
refers to Europe in the first paragraph of its program for the 2017 presidential 
elections, but this reference is used to promote Euroscepticism or criticism of 
the EU and European integration. The NR’s first priority is to return national 
sovereignty to France as the country becomes part of a ‘respectful Europe’ and 
a ‘Europe of independent nations’ ( Engagements pr ésidentiels Marine, 2017). 
While equally hostile to Islam and migrants as the AfD, the NR claims to defend 
French (rather than European) culture and civilization, as stated in article 91 
of the electoral programme. As for the Dutch PVV, its leader, Geert Wilders, 
has asserted that there is ‘no single European identity’, reaffirming his party’s 
absence of a clear programmatic position on the issue. Nevertheless, in several 
speeches, Wilders has echoed AfD’s von Storch by referring to a ‘European 
civilization . . . based on the legacy of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome’, and to 
Europe’s problems of ‘Islamization, terrorism and mass immigration’ ( Wilders, 
2017 ). The PVV holds the populist view that the EU usurps European identity 
and imposes an artificial political community upon the true European patriots. 
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 The Greek GD is a far-right fascist movement, its main objective being a 
Greek ‘nationalist revolution’. In the ‘Ideology’ section of its official website, 
it calls for a ‘Europe of nations’, like other populists do, as such a Europe 
would be a ‘political expression of ideological patriotism and nationalism at a 
pan-European level’, based on an intergovernmental approach that preserves 
national character ( Tassios, 2016 ). 
 Instead of foregrounding ethno-nationalism, the ideologically ambiguous and 
internally heterogenous Italian M5S prioritizes reforming the EU’s economic 
policies and ending austerity. According to the party programme, the only way 
to tackle Europe’s economic problems is by approaching them as sovereign and 
independent states in a multipolar world – a view that is consistent with other 
European populist parties. But the M5S also seeks to build an alliance of South-
ern European countries to ‘prevent Italy from becoming the source of cheap 
manual labor for Northern European countries and their tourist fun park’. 
According to the programme, Europe is ‘a geographic identity, whose values, 
history and peculiarities do not identify with the European Union and even less 
with the Euro’ ( Movimento 5 Stelle, 2018 ). To sum up this brief sketch, populist 
political programmes point to the emergence not of a common populist doc-
trine of European cultural identity but rather at an ensemble of shared ideas and 
attitudes – a sense of European heritage and values as superior to non-European 
ones, by which what is meant is often Islam – underpinning nationalist ideology. 
 What does a far-right European heritage look like? 
 When asked about the existence of a European culture, the CoHERE respon-
dents gave negative answers. But this was not the case when respondents 
reflected on the existence of a common European history. In the interviews, 
there are mentions of the Greek, Roman, and Christian heritage of Europe 
to which both supporters and party manifestos refer, yet only a minority of 
respondents perceive those cultural and religious roots as a basis for a coherent 
and tangible European culture. As many respondents stress, even though these 
common roots and shared experience of historical events represent ‘common 
points across Europe’, eventually each nation developed and retains its own 
culture. But how do ‘cultural’ conceptions of Europe and ideas of a common 
civilizational pool vary across our interviewees? 
 Despite their pronounced ideological differences, interviewees from the 
European South share an idea of European heritage, yet one that they feel is 
betrayed by a (Northern) Europe that does not appreciate Greek/Italian con-
tributions to it. Greek respondents in particular, and to an extent also the Ital-
ians, take credit for the values and principles the European Union was built 
upon  – democracy and even civilization itself. However, there is a notable 
absence of a spillover from the narratives on heritage/memory to those on 
culture/civilization. A few Italian M5S supporters emphasize that the Roman 
Empire once tried to keep Europe united, while almost all Greek interviewees 
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proudly state Europe’s Greek ancestry: ‘When we were teaching them [other 
Europeans] civilization, they were living in caves’. 2 For many Golden Dawn 
supporters, what is now called ‘European heritage’ is actually the heritage of 
Greek civilization. As an interviewee points out, ‘There is Greek memory and 
heritage in the European one, not the other way around’ (Male, 57, lawyer, 
Argos). In this view, Greek civilization is the origin of European civilization, 
but Europe refuses to recognize its ‘classical debt’ ( Hanink, 2017 ). 
 Different are the arguments put forward by the Northern interviewees – the 
Dutch, Germans, and French – who tend to distantiate themselves from South-
ern (and Eastern) Europeans, painting them as homogeneous blocks. Unlike in 
 Brubaker ’s (2017) sample, populist supporters in the Netherlands appear to be 
the most averse to notions of European culture. The French express the great-
est concern about its current deterioration, while the Germans position them-
selves between the two. While a number of Dutch respondents recognize the 
existence of ‘common points’ across European countries, they do not consider 
them to be defining elements of an overarching European culture and civili-
zation. Instead, they emphasize the differences between European countries, 
drawing a clear line between ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘There are too many differences 
between Southern Europeans and Northern Europeans, they are not the same. 
So we are more related to Germans, but I wouldn’t like to compare myself 
with Polish or Romanian people’ (Female, 54, housewife, Rotterdam). PVV 
supporters’ statements about the non-existence of a European culture and heri-
tage are tied to their strong perception of the persistence of  both cultural and 
economic differences within Europe – they clearly distinguish between poorer 
and richer countries – but also to their negative opinions concerning the EU. 
As we elaborate in more detail in the next section, the tendency to ‘culturalize’ 
economic and political divides and processes, and the related idea of distinct 
cultural regions within Europe, play an important role in shaping narratives of 
European identity, which is especially important in the Dutch case. Italy and 
Greece are mentioned by Dutch respondents as ‘economic problems’ for the 
Netherlands and its citizens, depicting the EU as a malfunctioning organization 
using Dutch taxpayers’ money to pay other countries’ debts. 3 
 By expressing concerns about European culture’s deterioration due to immi-
gration (without mentioning economic disparities), many French respondents 
indirectly endorse the idea of a common identity. The majority explicitly 
acknowledge the existence of a shared European heritage and historical mem-
ory grounded in common experiences and religious roots, which finally cul-
minated in the EU’s creation. This European heritage is imbued with colonial 
nostalgia for the past ‘great empires’. Such is the narrative: 
 Yes, there is a European culture. Christianity is one of the factors unifying 
Europe. There is a culture with Greek-Latin bases. The great empires, and 
the Christian civilization, are factors unifying the Europeans. 
 (Male, 31, parliamentary assistant, Toulon) 
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 However, only half of the sample agree on the actual existence of a European 
culture and civilization in the present. Instead, the other half claim that ‘a 
European history does exist, but not a European culture’ (Male, 50, unem-
ployed, Romorantin-Lanthenay), because each country retains its own cul-
ture and traditions. This indicates a considerable level of convergence between 
the Dutch and French narratives, as respondents from both countries express 
contradictory meanings of common heritage and common culture, ultimately 
decoupling the two and minimizing their mutual influence. For most of the 
French interviewees, the perceived spread of Islam and Muslim communities 
in Europe facilitates a nation-centred narrative instead of a European one. The 
NF supporters stress the importance of preserving their state’s  laïcité or (alleged) 
neutrality towards religious beliefs to preserve French identity and culture. 
Nevertheless, a few French interviewees do see an ‘Islamic threat’ challenging 
the whole of Europe. 
 Among the AfD respondents, the sample is evenly split between those rec-
ognizing the existence of both a European culture and memory/heritage and 
those who, instead, believe that there is no European culture because coun-
tries are too dissimilar. Yet, the German respondents do also point out, like 
in the Dutch sample, that the German nation and culture are very similar to 
other Northern European nations. As in the French NR sample, the German 
respondents foreground the religious and historical roots of Europe. As a con-
sequence, AfD supporters are very concerned, as are their NR counterparts, 
about the possible contamination and deterioration of European culture and 
values by migrants from culturally and religiously different countries: 
 We have a European culture because we are all similar to each other. We 
are different from Italians or Greeks but at the end we, as people from 
Europe, are more similar compared to people from Arabic countries. 
 . . . That wave of asylum seekers is a threat to our European heritage 
because they want ‘Arabistan’ here. 
 (Female, 56, saleswoman, Dresden) 
 As one of our reviewers, Markus Balkenhol, pointed out (see also  Barker, 
1981 ), right-wing populist understandings of identity here come very close to 
tribal ones, particularly to how anthropologists have rendered identity dynam-
ics and ‘contextual ethnicity’ in classic segmentary societies, like the Nuer of 
Sudan ( Evans-Pritchard, 1940 ). The Nuer nation is divided into tribes and 
those into segments that have many of the characteristics of a tribe itself, like 
a distinctive name, a unique territory, and a common sentiment. For Evans-
Pritchard, ‘the members of any segment unite for war against adjacent seg-
ments of the same order and unite with these adjacent segments against larger 
sections’. In other words, segments or lineages form an in-group identity when 
they are at war with other neighbouring lineages, but the same lineages that 
were once opposed may unite against a tribe of a bigger order – in the name 
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of common ancestors. These tribes, in turn, can form a comprehensive tribal 
identity when faced with an external enemy, for instance the British or the 
neighbouring Dinka nation. The populists in the CoHERE sample and par-
ticularly the AfD supporters of the last quote deploy a similar logic: the ‘Ger-
man nation’ is defined vis-à-vis the Italians, Greeks, and Poles. All of them can 
and in fact must unite – so the logic goes – in the face of an external, existential 
threat like Islam(ization), specifically those ‘asylum seekers’ who are said to aim 
to turn Europe into ‘Arabistan’. This logic makes ethnic groups into entities 
simultaneously bounded and flexible, ascribed via primordialist bonds, territo-
rial boundaries, and cultural traits, and yet shifting contextually, according to 
the specific scalar process at stake in any given moment. 
 Ethnic regionalism versus the EU 
 The idea of a Europe made up of different nations and cultural regions under-
girded by shared values and a shared civilizational heritage is widely recogniz-
able among our interviewees. Also common – if implicit – is the related notion 
that this European heritage is superior to others. A Le Pen supporter offers this 
narrative: 
 Europe was renowned all over the world, and spreads everywhere its val-
ues of democracy, its values of freedom, its culture. . . . In my opinion, 
there is a European civilization, which is important, which is beauti-
ful, which besides is diverse, really diverse. . . . When you are travelling 
in Europe, you see that it is diverse everywhere. There are the Eastern 
countries, which are the Slavic countries. There are the Northern coun-
tries. They are the Anglo-Saxons.  .  . . All the countries .  .  . Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands. . . . It’s also different. And there are the 
Latin languages. . . . All these mixes are contributing to define Europe as 
a renowned civilization. 
 (Male, 39, unemployed, Toulon) 
 This narrative foregrounds a number of key populist tropes – all shot through 
with contradictions. First, many interviewees refer to a common cultural foun-
dation, mostly articulated as a common European heritage/history and a set 
of shared ‘European values’. This common cultural foundation does not rule 
out national cultures. To the contrary, the nation’s primacy is buttressed by 
European values that are the product of a shared history and heritage. Second, 
Europe is both one and diverse. Such diversity is equated with the differ-
ent European nationalities but also with broad and vaguely defined European 
cultural regions, illustrated by the way the quote above slips from the national 
(‘Belgium’) to the regional (‘Northern Europe’). Here, culture (European, 
regional, national) is both fixed and flexible – deep rooted, primordial (‘Anglo-
Saxon’, ‘Latin’), anchored in space, and mapped onto a distinctive territory 
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whose boundaries must however remain conveniently fuzzy for this European 
puzzle to (seemingly) make sense. Third, this narrative exudes a sense of Euro-
pean superiority tinged with a nostalgic longing for colonial ‘grandeur’ of 
which the present is only a pale, ‘watered-down’ imitation. 
 The fact of populist discourse articulating the idiom of ‘diversity’ reflects 
the institutional EU language of ‘unity in diversity’, which percolates through 
political discourses opposed to it. But the way in which this NR supporter 
and many others in our sample speak about cultural diversity resonates with 
the right-wing theory of ethno-pluralism or ethno-regionalism, which divides 
the world into ethnically and culturally homogeneous nations and regions and 
accuses migrants of ‘messing up’ this naturally harmonic order ( Thran and 
Boehnke, 2015 : 200). 
 An important influence for the NR and other far-right formations across 
Europe, the French New Right ( Nouvelle Droite ) since the late 1960s has been 
theorizing ethno-regionalism as an alternative to multiculturalism, based on 
a strong idea of ‘cultural differentialism’ and the rejection of the fact of lived 
multiculture in Europe. For the New Right, immigration corrupts and cultur-
ally destroys both the host and immigrant societies ( Spektorowski, 2003 ). As 
the New Right manifesto declares, humanity is irreducibly diverse, made up 
of a variety of ‘races, ethnic groups, languages, customs, even religions’ and 
ultimately of different cultures, which alone provide the setting for human 
life to flourish: ‘Man [ sic ] is rooted by nature in his culture’ ( de Benoist and 
Champetier, 2012: 28, 19 ). In the twenty-first century, the ‘future belongs to 
large cultures and civilizations’ ( de Benoist and Champetier, 2012: 38 ), like the 
European and the North American ones, in a world in absolute need of ‘clear 
and strong identities’ (de Benoist and Champetier, 2012: 32). Grouped around 
the think tank GRECE (Research and Study Group for European Civiliza-
tion), New Right intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist have theorized the 
rebirth of an old/new ethno-regional Europe united by a common cultural 
foundation. While New Right proponents loudly argue that their ideas are not 
racist because their differentialism is ‘culturally’ and not ‘racially’ based ( Betz, 
2003 ; see also de Benoist, 1999), their civilizational Europeanism and vision 
of a cultural Europe where alleged non-Europeans have no place smacks of a 
deeply racialized European superiority as well as also of ethnically cleansed, 
projected geographies. 4 (For de Benoist, ‘the European race is not the absolute 
superior race. It is only the most apt to progress’, quoted in  Spektorowski, 
2016 : 126). 
 In our sample, cultural difference is always, if more or less explicitly, marked, 
its renderings sliding into cultural racism. Ideas of cultural hierarchies and 
moral taxonomies of cultures and heritages within and beyond Europe perco-
late through the CoHERE interviews. Some cultural regions do move in and 
out of Europe in interviewees’ perceptions, depending on where they con-
tingently draw Europe’s borders, which is always a very context-dependent 
exercise. Europe is often equated with Western Europe or a Western Europe 
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plus (a ‘core Europe’ surrounded by a lesser European periphery or a fluid bor-
derland of uncertain European status). These are some sound bites: 
 When I say Europe I mean Western Europe, I cannot relate with people 
coming from Romania. 
 (Female, 54, housewife, Rotterdam) 
 European civilization and culture exist, and it’s limited to some countries – 
Italy, Spain, England, Portugal, France, Germany. Maybe also Hungary 
and Poland. 
 (Male, 54, executive in industry, Romorantin-Lanthenay) 
 Europe expanded from six to twenty-eight countries. I agree to integrate 
countries, but poor countries such as Romania or Bulgaria is [ sic ] not good. 
 (Male, 23, graphic designer, Romorantin-Lanthenay) 
 With this blatant enlargement of the EU, taking countries such as Bulgaria, 
the whole idea of European culture has been watered down. 
 (Male, 49, printer, Dresden) 
 Whatever they think about a cultural Europe notwithstanding, CoHERE 
interviewees have a negative opinion of the European Union. The EU is 
often described as a failure, a ‘union of the bankers’ (M5S), devoid of equal-
ity among its member states (GD), using money to pay other countries’ 
debts (PVV), and causing nations’ loss of sovereignty (NF). The Italian and 
Greek respondents stress the EU’s inability and unwillingness to help its 
own member states cope with the economic and the refugee crises, as well 
as the ‘disparities and Germany being the master of EU’ – a ‘cruel’ union 
of unequally treated countries in which the richest countries’ well-being is 
preserved at the expense of the suffering ones. Deep frustration with the EU 
institutions is dominant in the CoHERE interviews. Images of corruption 
abound. Dutch interviewees share negative feelings towards the EU, but they 
justify them by complaining that ‘our money is used to pay their debts’ – 
‘their’ refers to Greece, Italy, and sometimes Portugal. The overwhelming 
impression is one of disappointment, frustration, and failed expectations 
about Europe – and the sense of a deep lack of solidarity, which is sought, 
instead, in the nation. 
 Corrosive multiculturalism: culture as nature 
 Rejection of immigration and multiculturalism is a standard feature of nearly 
all the interviews. NF supporters are not alone in their anxieties about an 
alleged ‘Islamization’. Respondents from all five countries claim a loss of 
culture and heritage by way of a multiculturalism they strongly associate with 
failing EU policies. The Italian interviewees are the only relative exception 
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to this tendency, which can be explained by the M5S’s ideological specific-
ity and anomaly (‘beyond Left and Right’). Yet, even in the M5S sample 
a number of interviewees oppose multiculturalism as a form of ‘cultural 
contamination’ provoking a loss of identity. The following is far from an 
uncommon idea: 
 We [Europeans] have a legacy, and this from being positive has become 
negative because we are in an era of dislocation, multiculturalism. There 
are wars between cultures with a will to form one culture to take the oth-
er’s place and make it disappear: I think of Islam, which wants to impose 
itself as the new European culture. 
 (Male, 54, executive in industry, Romorantin-Lanthenay) 
 If people are rooted in their cultures, which are in turn anchored to specific 
territories, immigration and cultural mixing compromise this order and lead 
to ‘wars between cultures’ and a gloomy scenario of alternating cultural inva-
sions and cultural extinctions. We see here a politics of fear that stokes anxieties 
about an Islamic invasion (Wodak, 2015;  de Koning and Modest, 2017 ). 
 But the CoHERE interviews also display what Markha  Valenta (2011 ) calls 
a ‘politics of bad memories’, erasing cultural change and exchange as well as 
migration and global connections from the history of Europe. For Valenta, 
this politics generates a public memory of shocking change whereby people 
with irreconcilable values and civilizational ‘others’ disrupt an imaginary stable 
sociality of rooted, homogeneous communities of mutuality. But ‘this yearn-
ing for the old pre-immigrant Europe is a yearning for a Europe that never 
existed: a Europe disentangled and distinct from the rest of the world’, for 
Europe was made through its ‘extra-European’ entanglements, at the very least 
from colonialism and imperialism onwards. As noted earlier, appealing to colo-
nial nostalgia – what Paul  Gilroy (2004 ) calls ‘postcolonial melancholia’ – is 
common in some populist discourse. Here it is reflected in the interviewees’ 
responses when they refer to something that no longer exists, rather than to 
something that has never existed: 
 This European culture is disappearing. It doesn’t exist anymore; it’s com-
posed of national cultures opposing each other. 
 (Male, 54, executive in industry, Romorantin-Lanthenay) 
 Culture and heritage here become human nature and are fixed in place. All the 
interviewed supporters emphasize a strong perception of essentialized cultural 
differences, understood not so much as biological but as fundamental and essen-
tially unchangeable (and thus almost biologized) traits. National and regional 
cultures (often associated with religions) are facts of a person’s life and radically 
different from each other. Muslims are not part of France or Europe because 
they are alien to French and European culture and history. The assumption is 
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one of a strict isomorphism nation/Europe-culture-territory that alone can 
guarantee social harmony. Fascist GD supporters make this point clear: 
 The Homeland-Religion-Family ideal is falling apart, and I do not want it 
to collapse. I want the Greek to be a Greek. 
 (Male, 39, cafe owner, Nafplio) 
 Greece should accept immigrants, but under some conditions, with rules, 
like in the rest of Europe. It will not become Europe’s dump. Greeks first 
and then others. 
 (Male, 63, dentist, Agia Triada) 
 These statements are based on a menacing fantasy: the presence of non-Greeks 
and cultural ‘others’ on Greek soil endangers the particular ‘homeland-religion-
family’ set-up that makes a Greek, a Greek (in Greece). 5 At the heart of nation-
alism is the idea of the primordial existence of the nation ‘whose “peculiar 
character” is . . . constituted by cultural factors such as language or historical 
awareness’ ( Leerssen, 2006 : 560). According to nationalist logic, a nation is 
a nation because of its distinctive culture and heritage ( Handler, 1985 ). But 
the twin ideas of the primordial existence of the nation and of homogeneous 
national cultures rooted in place are an invention, a fiction, generated by a 
multitude of sites, institutions, discourses, and practices ( Anderson, 1983 ; 
 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983 ). The very discipline dedicated to the study 
of culture, anthropology, has critiqued since at least the 1980s this notion of 
bounded, territorialized cultures and unchanging systems of beliefs, values, and 
practices (e.g.  Gupta and Ferguson, 1997 ). Cultures and heritages are not neat 
locations on a map. Consequently, supporters easily slip between national and 
European sets of values and ways of life. 
 Several NF and AfD voters embrace their party’s cues and express concern 
about European cultural decline. In many cases, the presence of Muslims and 
immigrants is identified as a national danger. Dutch respondents are highly 
critical of what some call a ‘forced melting pot’ imposed by the EU through 
its ‘bad’ policies and regulations. The Dutch interviewees come out as the 
most nationalist and xenophobic of all, declaring that many or even most refu-
gees are only ‘pretending to be refugees’ to benefit from Dutch welfare. They 
stress the need to protect Dutch people and the Dutch nation, and they reject 
multiculturalism as a way to preserve ‘the nation’s cultural core’. The latter is 
a fiction that is supported by many non-populists as well. Significantly, the 
(liberal) Dutch prime minister, at the time of these interviews, had bragged 
about ‘Dutch norms and values’ during the electoral campaign in an open letter 
telling those who do not respect Dutch customs and criticize Dutch values to 
leave the country ( Henley, 2017 ). 
 Like the Dutch respondents, the German populist supporters reject a multi-
cultural Germany. But they specifically highlight the incompatibility of Muslim 
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and Christian religious traditions and social norms according to a logic that 
leads many of them to the conclusion that integration is impossible. For many 
French interviewees, immigrants’ ‘assimilation’ into French society is better 
than multiculturalism and a much-demonized ‘communitarisme’, but it is 
essentially doomed to fail. A German AfD supporter goes back to the ‘origins 
of Europe’ to draw a lesson for the present about the dangers of muddling this 
order of discreet, territorialized cultures and heritages: 
 With the ancient Rome, we had a European heritage. But you already 
know why the old Rome had fallen, right? Because all the politicians were 
corrupt and because everything was multicultural there. That is why you 
can see striking parallels to today, and if you do so, you should pay atten-
tion at all costs, right? 
 (Male, 42, unemployed, Dresden) 
 Several French Le Pen supporters viewed things similarly. For one, mixing cul-
tures is a ‘bad cooking recipe’ as it is ‘absurd’ to expect that doing so would pro-
duce something good; 6 for another, ‘vivre-ensemble is a total illusion, a kind 
of stick, and they slap us with that from the morning to the night, and make us 
accept a situation which does not run and which had never run’. 7 Mixing does 
not work because cultures are unchangeable, with very deep roots in a specific 
territory and the past, and incommensurable with each other. 
 A heritage both religious and secular: Islam as 
the non-European 
 In Pegida’s discourse, the signifier ‘European’ largely overlaps with ‘Western’, 
but it essentially refers to no more than ‘non-Islamic’. In this logic, Europeans 
should unify against the threat of an Islamization which, if implemented, would 
mean the death of Europe and its values. Europe’s common heritage is explic-
itly Christian, at times Judeo-Christian, as a German AfD supporter explained: 
 The foundations for our European heritage were laid in ancient Athens 
and Jerusalem. We are Christian-Jewish and have our roots in the Roman 
Empire. Our roots also lie in scholasticism, for example, Thomas von 
Aquin. The Enlightenment is, of course, also crucial to the European heri-
tage, just like the Reformation of the European-Western world. All in all, 
the civilising draft of a Western European civilisation began long before 
our time. 
 (Female, 67, retired, Dresden) 
 This is a positive, celebratory narrative. The ‘tripod’ (ancient Greek democracy + 
Roman legal tradition + Christianity) that, per Vasilopoulou (2017), grounds 
the far right’s civilizational definition of Europe, combines here with a 
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celebration of the source of liberal values (the Enlightenment) and colonial 
nostalgia. This complex statement, which resonates with other interviewees’ 
narratives, encapsulates the crucial features of the populist idea of European 
heritage. Here, evoking a ‘(Western) European civilization’, implicitly under-
stood as superior to others, goes together with a form of ‘postcolonial mel-
ancholia’ ( Gilroy, 2004 ) reminiscent of the ‘civilizing mission’ and the old 
colonial ‘grandeur’ – a discourse which of course erases the massive violence 
of colonialism and its enduring, pernicious effects in the present ( Stoler, 2011 , 
 2016 ). But colonialism is not the only murderous past of Europe that is erased 
from this narrative. So too is the Holocaust – what many well beyond the 
EU agree is the very foundation of a common European memory. Indeed, as 
Adorno and others have shown, celebrating ‘the civilizing draft’ of Western 
European civilization is only possible if one ‘forgets’ its barbarism ( Horkheimer 
and Adorno, 1972 ). 
 Interviewees’ narratives are rife with tensions and contradictions. First, these 
are supporters of parties with (not too distant) illiberal roots and even fascist 
histories of antisemitism, yet they champion liberal values and even forms of 
‘philo-Semitism’ ( Brubaker, 2017 ). Second, their emphasis on religion (pri-
marily Christianity but also, here, Judaism) as the source of core European 
values clashes with their celebration of Europe’s  laïcité and Enlightenment sec-
ularism. These contradictions, however, serve an important ideological role 
in right-wing populist discourse: if a liberal philo-Semitism enables populists 
to protect themselves from defaming accusations of racism (which in Europe 
tends to be associated exclusively with the Nazi past), their embrace of secu-
larism marks their distance from an Islam deemed irredeemably illiberal in the 
negative sense. 
 These contradictions begin to make sense if one considers them in light 
of right-wing populists’ distorted perception of Islam. What strengthens the 
European bond in populists’ eyes is what they identify as Europe’s most danger-
ous enemy: Islam’s radical otherness. A German AfD supporter underscores 
this: ‘We have a European culture because we are all more similar to each 
other than for example to Arabs or Turks. . . . This wave of asylums is a threat 
to our European heritage’. This is a very good example of what David Theo 
 Goldberg (2006 ) has called ‘racial Europeanization’ or the racial ‘contouring’ of 
Europeanness which today sees a ‘shift in Europe’s dominant fixation of con-
cern and resentment from the figure of “the Black” (and prior to World War II 
that of “the Jew”) to that of “the Muslim”’ (349). 
 This is a reactionary mobilization of Europeanness – reactionary because 
it is a response to the perceived invasion of cultural ‘aliens’ that makes Euro-
peans unify and rediscover or reinvent their commonalities. It is also a very 
good example of the essentialist notion of separate civilizational heritages as 
unchangeable sets of cultural traits, traditions, and values rooted in a deep-
seated history, which undergirds much right-wing populist discourse as well as 
more widespread forms of cultural racism ( Lentin and Titley, 2011 ). One of the 
A common European heritage? 41
features of today’s ‘new racism’ is precisely its own denial (e.g.  Goldberg, 2015 ), 
the staunch refusal to admit the durability of institutions of the past in the pres-
ent, of long-standing hierarchies of cultural worth and their differential impact 
on people’s lives and very life chances ( Stoler, 2016 ; Wekker, 2016). Many 
populists (and non-populists) today deny being racist but admit strong ideas of 
cultural difference and incommensurability. ‘It’s about culture, not race’ is the 
argument. But for many, ‘culture’ is a code word for race as it has the power 
to solidify the fluid fact of cultural difference. Heritage plays a role in this 
dynamic, for it renders culture as deep rooted and thus immutable. A (political) 
community is its culture, its way of life, its traditions, its heritage. And the gist 
of the argument of this new racism is that immigrants and refugees, particularly 
Muslims, as cultural others and radically alien to both national and European 
heritage, threaten to destroy the homogeneity of such ‘civilization’. 
 As our interview analysis demonstrates, populist right-wing forces uphold an 
essentialized notion of European heritage that tends to go overlooked in politi-
cal science analyses. That a fiery nationalism and a focus on national traditions, 
norms, and values coexists with a sense of Europeanness and a shared European 
civilization in the discourse of the new populist right (itself remarkably trans-
national) is a paradox that deserves more scholarly attention. This broader sense 
of cultural identity resonates with Samuel Huntington’s idea that the world is 
divided into different civilizations, marked by different cultures and religions, 
which clash with each other as the main source of today’s conflict ( Huntington, 
1993 ) – ideas that have become tremendously influential well beyond scholarly 
circles after 9/11 and the war on terror. For Huntington, Western civilization 
includes the US and Canada but not the Balkans and Greece, which are part 
of the Orthodox world, and is engaged in a major conflict with the world of 
Islam. Unsurprisingly, our interviewees distinguish the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Slavic’ 
countries as a separate bloc and refer to a Christian (sometimes a Judeo-Christian) 
civilization as the shared heritage of Europe. 
 To sum up, our interviews show a number of tensions in populist supporters’ 
notion of heritage, which emerges as an important category in people’s per-
sonal and political lives. Heritage gives depth, roots, and continuity to today’s 
cultures and identities. If ‘Europe’ is a Europe of nations (like the name of the 
populists’ group at the European Parliament), right-wing populists espouse a 
sense of civilizational Europeanness and of European heritage, which is how-
ever fuzzily defined by its radical otherness from Islam – both secular (in the 
tradition of the Enlightenment) and Christian at the same time. 
 The problem(s) with European heritage 
 The populists in our sample mostly rule out the existence, let alone the desid-
erability, of a European culture, yet many of them refer to a common Euro-
pean heritage. Their narratives articulate a form of civilizational Europeanism 
grounded in ideas of a shared civilizational pool and shared histories, which 
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translate into shared values. These are radically different, incommensurable 
with those of other civilizations, particularly with regards to religion. Populists 
deftly combine this belief in a shared cultural foundation with a strong sense 
of a diversity of discreet European cultures – national and sometimes regional. 
Northern European interviewees doubt whether Eastern and, at times, South-
ern Europe are truly part of European civilization. While even the Southern 
European interviewees in our sample feel forcibly excluded from it, for certain 
there is no space for non-Europeans, however defined. Despite being riddled 
with such tensions and contradictions (for instance, where are the borders of 
such civilizational Europe?), this brand of Europeanism exudes colonial nos-
talgia and a sense of European superiority; however, this is perceived as being 
currently under mortal attack by other civilizations. 
 Our findings show that embracing Europeanism does not at all rule out 
embracing vicious nationalism and forms of cultural fundamentalism and cul-
tural racism. Even more troubling is the long shadow this populist European 
discourse casts on EU cultural policies themselves. These findings indicate 
that, despite multiple European crises, Europe is increasingly imagined as a 
diverse but essentially united cultural space, a bounded culture-based com-
munity, which is racialized in subtle ways and therefore excludes those who 
are ‘in’ Europe but not considered ‘of ’ it (Balibar, 2004). EU policymakers 
as well as scholars working in EU-funded projects like CoHERE, who both 
study and produce European memory and heritage, are often unintentionally 
involved in the very processes of racialization that we criticize. While both 
policymakers and intellectuals like Derrida have long celebrated the progres-
sive, inclusive, ‘post-national’ qualities of European memory and heritage, as 
opposed to national and nationalistic ones, ‘actually existing’ constructions of 
European heritage often depart substantially from such post-national visions. 
In fact (some) EU cultural policy indirectly reinstates asymmetric us/them dis-
tinctions that it was originally meant to supersede. 
 The populist Europeanism we have analyzed in this chapter points to key pit-
falls of widely circulated constructions of European heritage. The first problem 
is the fiction of the closure of culture and heritage by territory and the natu-
ralization of a normative isomorphism nation/Europe-culture-territory, which 
erases the reality of multiculture and turns cultural diversity into a matter of 
national differences. The EU’s motto of ‘unity in diversity’ is often interpreted 
in this way. A good example is the inaugural exhibition  It’s Our History! of the 
first museum of Europe in Brussels, which centres on the video testimonies of 
contemporary European citizens narrating their own life stories. Chosen for 
their nationality (one individual with one testimony per EU member state), 
these Europeans are all white and do not show any sign of religious or other, 
non-national diversity. 
 The (lack of) diversity of this allegedly representative sample of Europeans 
then exposes the second major problem of these kinds of Europeanism – that 
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is, the lurking risk of constructing European heritage as Christian and, sub-
tly, white. For Yildiz et al. (2016), ‘the overtly racist outrages of neo-fascist/
far-right populisms merely make explicit and blunt the delicate matter of 
the inextricability of  any Europeanism from the propagation of “European”-
ness as a formation of racial whiteness, even as it emphatically dissimulates 
race in favour of ostensibly “cultural” or “civilizational” constructions of 
difference’ (see also de Genova, 2018). Contemporary dominant narratives 
of Europeanness tend to obscure the long, tentacular history of colonial 
domination and the ways in which these global entanglements have forged 
Europe’s past and present. In so doing, they produce fictional reconstruc-
tions of European history as an ‘insular and hermetically-sealed affair’ ( Yildiz 
et al., 2016 ), as illustrated by the new major Brussels museum of Europe, 
the European Parliament’s House of European History, which devotes to 
colonialism only a small section of its nineteenth-century gallery. What do 
we do with this idea of ‘European heritage’ that is so ambiguous – both 
potentially open-ended, inclusive, even emancipatory and, on the opposite 
end, tinted with cultural racism? 
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 Notes 
 1 Less than ten years old, the Five Star Movement purports to have overcome the traditional 
left-right divide by bringing together traditional themes, stances, and policies of both the 
left and the right, from the defence of the commons to the opposition to migration, into 
a heterogeneous mix – all under the sign of a celebration of e-democracy. The Five Star 
Movement then is an outlier in ideological terms, not defining itself as right wing like the 
other parties of the CoHERE sample. 
  2  This is an extremely popular phrase – common sense – since it was mentioned almost 
verbatim by a considerable number of Greek interviewees. 
  3  These are the quotes: ‘Stop sending money to European countries which will never pay 
them back, like Greece or Italy and Portugal, in the future. This is lost money that should 
be spent in our own society’ (Female, 54, housewife, Rotterdam). Or ‘Cooperation is 
good but only with some countries like Germany and Belgium, our main economic 
partners. We don’t need Italy and Greece’ (Male, 56, unemployed, Rotterdam). 
  4  Interestingly, New Right thinkers like de Benoist are anticolonialist and anti-imperialist 
because they see the direct connection between colonialism/imperialism and migration, 
which is a long-term consequence of it (de Benoist, 1999; de Benoist and Champetier, 
2012; Spektorowski, 2003). 
  5  Unlike the Germans and the French, the Greek respondents did not specifically mention 
Islam as a threat but emphasized migrants as triggering negative cultural dynamics. 
  6  Male, 44, local civil servant, Toulon. 
  7  Male, 65, retired, Grenoble. 
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